Wentzel van Huyssteen (1942-2022) in memoriam
Niels Henrik Gregersen, University of Copenhagen
The prominent member of ISSR, J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, sadly died February 18 this year, a few months before his 80th birthday. At the 2022 Meeting of the American Academy of Religion in Denver, the ISSR arranged a session on “The Legacy of J Wentzel van Huyssteen: Commemoration and Critiques” on November 19 with panelists including Danie Veldsman, Nancy Howell, Kirk Wechter-McNelly, Andrew Rick-Miller, and myself. The point of the session was to take stock of van Huyssteen’s work up from his early career to his mature work, epitomized in his Gifford Lectures, Alone in the World? From 2006. The session turned out to be moving by including also personal reflections from the panelists and audience on van Huyssteen as teacher, colleague, and inspirer.
From South Africa to Princeton, and back
Born as a native South African on April 29 1942, van Huyssteen obtained degrees in both theology and philosophy before he began his startling career. In the end of the 1960s, he went with his wife Hester to Münich and Amsterdam to complete his Doctorate in Theology on Wolfhart Pannenberg at the Free University of Amsterdam in 1970. Coming back to South Africa he lectured at the Huguenot Colle in Wellington alongside working as minister in the Dutch Reformed Church. In 1972, he was appointed Professor and Chair in Religious Studies at the University of Port Elizabeth, until he in 1992 took up the position as the first James J. McCord Professor in science and theology at Princeton Theological Seminary 1992. He stayed in Princeton until his retirement in 2014, when the van Huyssteen family finally returned to its home country.
Phases of J. Wentzel van Huyssteen’s work
One of his students, Kenneth A. Reynhout (2006) has helpfully distinguished between three phases of van Huyssteen’s work
- The first phase on “Critical Realism as rationality model for theology” (1970-1989)
- The second phase on “The interdisciplinary shaping of rationality in a postmodern context” (1990-1999), and
- The third phase on “the evolutionary origins of rationality and human uniqueness” (1999-onwards).
Across these phases, there are some recurrent signatures of van Huyssteen’ his work. For example, a phenomenological undercurrent pervades his interdisciplinary models by focusing on first hand experiences. His philosophical Master Thesis on Truth and Relativism in the Thought of Maurice Merleau-Ponty from 1966 testifies to his early engagement with body phenomenology. This sense of bodily experiences refurbishes in his later work, for example in his 2006 article “When Our Bodies Do the Thinking, Theology and Science Converge”. Here the embodied “patterns of our daily experience” are seen as the inevitable entry point for any interdisciplinary thinking (van Huyssteen 2006a, 153).
Critical Realism and Epistemic Convictions
The 1st phase of critical realism (1970-1989) was epitomised in his Theology and the Justification of Faith: Constructing Theories in Systematic Theology (1988). Critical realism was the game of the day in science-religions in those days, shared by Ian Barbour, Arthur Peacocke, John Polkinghorne, and Ernan McMullin. Soon, however, one notices the watermarks of van Huyssteen’s position. On the one hand, he took a more pragmatist orientation insofar as both science and theology is about problem solving within lived research traditions. On the other, he always underlined the personal aspects of rationality. In the sciences, there may be a commitment to mathematics or algorithmic modeling, just as there is an assumption of the constancy of energy. Likewise, within theology, he emphasized “the high degree of personal commitment in religious and theological theorizing” (1997, 6). Also as scholars, we are embodied and socially embedded in traditions of inquiry. In the end, it is not propositions that are rational or irrational, but human persons who are more or less rational, insofar as they can give reasons for their views in communication with others.
So, for example, when Wolfhart Pannenberg spoke about theology as a hypothesis of God capable of covering all relevant data, van Huyssteen translated Pannenberg’s program as implying that a theology should “succeed in maximally solving and meaningfully integrating problematic data and mankind’s experiences of reality” (1988, 95).
This emphasis on problem-solving and experiential meaning can, with hindsight, be seen as a signature of the more overt pragmaticist orientation of van Huyssteen’s later work. In 1989, he thus argued that Pannenberg’s emphasis on theological propositions and “statements” should be understood as “convictions” (1997, 59). Whereas for Pannenberg, the idea of God – as a statement about something – is kept “distinct from the person who makes that statement” (1997, 119), van Huyssteen’s order goes the other way around, from personal convictions to theological statements. Discussing Karl Popper, he asks whether personal faith – which operates in ‘the context of discovery’ – is fully separate from the theoretical context of justification. Religious interpretation is always self-involving, whereby the explainer him- or herself becomes part of what is to be explained.
Towards a Multifaceted Concept of Interdisciplinarity
Here we arrive to the 2nd phase (1990-1999), epitomized in The Shaping of Rationality: Towards Interdisciplinarity in Theology and Science (1999). Already in the first phase we found an incipient pragmatist orientation: Both science and theology is about solving problems, sometimes also letting the problems stay as dilemmas that cannot be treated as solvable, given the present-day status of knowledge.
Overall, van Huyssteen wanted to steer a middle part between modernism and foundationalism on the one hand, and postmodern non-foundationalism on the other. He thus presented a “postfoundationalist” framework for theology, while arguing for a broader concept of rationality that again, typically, is not about sentences but about the full scale of the cognitive, social, and emotional reasons that people have for their life and theory choices. While the sciences embody the strongest model of cognitive theories we have, they may not always retain the highest level of social and emotional sophistication needed to bring science to bear within human culture.
This is not the place to go into detail with van Huyssteen’s argument on the multifaceted concept of rationality in this postmodern phase of his work. Allow me to mention some discussions from my collaborations with Wentzel from this period. Sometimes I feared that Wentzel, in his emphasis on epistemology, would withdraw from engaging with the substance of scientific descriptions of reality. In our common publication, Rethinking Theology and Science from 1997, we worked very swiftly together but we had a disagreement on the title and venue of our common introduction. Wentzel wanted to have “postmodern” in the title (a concept still en vogueat that time). I refused to do so, as I held that it’s sloppy term, so we ended on “cognitive pluralism”. I was grateful for this concession from his side, typical for his generous attitude towards a younger colleague.
Evolutionary Origins of Rationality and Religion
Soon, van Huyssteen embarked vehemently on more substance-oriented engagements with science. So in the end my worries were corrected. This is evident from the 3rd phase of his work on the evolutionary origins of rationality and human uniqueness (1999-onwards).
Already in 1997, he delivered the John Albert Hall Lectures given at the University of Victoria, Canada, published as Duet or Duel? Theology and Science in the Postmodern World in 1998. Here van Huyssteen emphasized the “semantic surplus” of different rationalities, arguing, for example, that theological redescriptions of the world “can never be merely a mirroring of the world of science. It is always, rather, a complementary view in which the very special epistemological focus, distinct experiential dimension and heuristic apparatus of theological reflection creatively illuminate not only the world of science, but also the wider world around it” (1998, 161). Certainly, scientific understandings of the world are obviously capable of criticizing inherited views of theology, but theology uses other epistemic resources as well by addressing aspects of reality and human concerns of which the natural sciences so far have no particular interest. Accordingly, theology is not to be described as a causal explanation in conflict with scientific explanations, but rather as a complementary interaction with reality. One thing is causal explanation; another thing is semantic explication. Indeed there remains a broad basis for all theological reasoning: “[A]ll systematic theology may be said to be basically interpretative or hermeneutical, but then hermeneutical in a sense that concerns not only meaning but also the question of truth.” Thus, Wentzel did not want to succumb to the “pan-linguistic folly”, as he put it, of current strands of hermeneutical philosophy and deconstructive postmodernism (2007. 431-32).
This turn to substantial aspects of science came to the fore in the Gifford Lectures at Edinburgh University given under the name Are We Alone? Science and Theology on Human Uniqueness, later published under a slightly changed title. He now programmatically stated that it is indeed “implausible, even to talk about ‘theology and science’ in any generic, abstract, or a-contextual sense”; on the role of theologians, he argued that “the vague terms ‘theology and science’ should be replaced by specific theologians who are trying to do very specific kinds of theologies and are attempting to enter into interdisciplinary dialogue with very specific scientists, working within specified sciences on clearly defined, shared problems” (2006b, 4).
Accordingly, Alone in the World? discusses the species specificity of humanity in close conversation with leading paleoanthropologist such as Ian Tattersal and Steven Mithen and archaeologists such as Ian Hodder. How to speak of the humans as created in the image and likeness of God in discussions with the findings of archeology and paleoanthropology? I guess I am correct in saying that van Huyssteen’s book is the only comprehensive book dealing with this subject matter from a theologically informed perspective.
In a sense, these Gifford Lectures are themselves a chief exemplification of the idea of a “transversal” interdisciplinarity developed in The Shaping of Rationality. The point of Alone in the World? is exactly to show how “[t]ransversal lines of argument between evolutionary epistemology and paleoanthropology converge and intersect on the fact that the very first modern humans were distinct in the evolution of their symbolic, cognitive fluid minds” (2006b, 212). Cognitive fluidity (Steven Mithen) inevitably leads to the creative symbolic behavior witnessed in cave art and in the emergence of religious awareness.
With evolutionary epistemology, van Huysteen understands human species as a particular form of an information processing system: “[N]ot only has evolution produced cognitive phenomena, but evolution itself can be as a cognition process or, more precisely, a cognition process” (2006b, 87). We are thus carrying with us earlier instincts (for example, fear of snakes) in a phylogenetic memory that is not in principle different from the snarling of kittens at dogs. Moreover, this phylogenetic memory must have had some adaptive value, also for early humans. Even if never fully “correct,” such species-wide knowledge has proven to be over-all reliable by facilitating appropriate forms of orientation vis-à-vis the environment.
Why Religion is not Exceptional
This view also led van Huyssteen to criticizing leading voices within evolutionary epistemologists. Franz Wuketits, for example, admitted that human cognition also entails a drive for metaphysical explanation, including notions of another world and life after death (2006b, 94). But curiously enough, Wuketits founds this religious awareness to be fully unreliable, and without any importance for the future development of the human race. Here, van Huyssteen stood up against Wuketits for abruptly making religion an exception rather than part of ordinary human encounters with reality: “Why should we, so suddenly and only on this point, distrust the phylogenetic memories of our direct ancestors, and should the emergence of religious consciousness be explained only in terms of specific life-conditions in prehistoric times? Might there mot be something about being human, something about the human condition itself, that could offer us a slightly different perspective on the enduring need for religious faith?” (2006b, 218).
van Huyssteen, of course, was fully aware that evolutionary epistemology can’t be used to bolster the correctness of particular religious views, just as it can’t serve as a proof of the reality of God. But he insisted that for reasons of consistency the space opened by religious awareness should be treated fully on par with other outcomes of evolutionarily evolved cognitions such as morality and emotionality. As a matter of fact, the questioning of the material limitations of human existence seems to be species specific to humanity, and evolutionary epistemology should be interactionist and bodily in orientation, rather than merely building on formal cognitivist schemata. This is a view informed by his engagement with Merleau-Ponty (2006b, 276). Understanding human personhood and community formation from an interactionist perspective, led van Huyssteen to focus on human agency as involving relationships to ecological environments, constantly remolded by human intervention, and guided by the use of symbolic thought unique to the human species. As a result we may not be so vastly different from our forebears. As van Huyssteen notes, the Cro-Magnons of the Upper Paleolithic were, in a sense, “us” (2006b, 218).
Personal words of remembrance and gratitude
Family and friends are still in a process of mourning after Wentzel’s death, this applies to me as well. But it would be wrong, and somehow out of touch with Wentzel’s mindset, only to be sad. There is also a time to commemorate and celebrate the achievement of a life work, and to express words of gratitude for his life. For me, as well as for many others, Wentzel van Huyssteen was a mentor who opened the US-American academy, and to many of us he very soon became a colleague and a friend, somehow always the wiser one.
The first time I met Wentzel was at the Fourth European Conference on Science and Theology held in 1992 in Rocca di Papa near Rome, hosted by ESSSAT and the Specola Vaticana, the astronomical observatory of the Vatican. The theme was “Origins, Time and Complexity”, but what I admittedly remember better was a long coffee talk I had with Wentzel, both of us facing the volcanic lakes of the area. We talked about Wolfhart Pannenberg, with whom we had both studied, and on whose philosophical theology we had both published. More importantly, we talked about the future development of the field of theology and science. At that time, Wentzel had just made the challenging career move from the University of Port Elizabeth in South Africa to become the first holder of the James I. McCord Professorship of Theology and Science at Princeton Theological Seminary by January 1, 1992.
During the coffee (in an unguarded moment, perhaps), Wentzel invited me to visit him in Princeton. I seized the moment. Next fall I arrived with a big trunk at Dickinson Street, and shamelessly abused the hospitality of Hester and Wentzel van Huyssteen. I used to call Wentzel “the Lion”, since he was such an excellent conference man, and I began also to name him and Hester “the Lion and his Lioness”. But soon I learned that this wonderful couple could as well be approached as “Her Lioness and her Lion”. I’m forever indebted to Hester and Wentzel for not kicking me out of Dickinson Street after three day. I remain forever indepted to to their hospitality, and for our friendship!
Wentzel had a rare social intelligence and a sense humor as only few. He simply liked people, cared for them, smiled at them, and laughed with them. At his funeral in Stellenbosch February 2022, his son Henk put it the way that his father always had grasped life with both his hands. It could be added that he also, with his own cultural manners, stretched out his arms to embrace life. There was an atmosphere of width around with, even when he was very focused on his work. And there was a beautiful span between the always impeccably dressed and perfectionist conference lion Wentzel, and the relaxed family man and down-dressed Princetonian in Dickinson Street. This was an unusually open home, therefore unforgettable.
Literature:
Reynhout, Kenneth A. 2006. “The Evolution of van Huyssteen’s Model of Rationality” in The Evolution of Rationality. Interdisciplinary Essays in Honor of J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, ed. F. Leron Shults, 1-18. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.
van Huyssteen, Wentzel. 1989. Theology and the Justification of Faith. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.
van Huyssteen, J. Wentzel. 1997. Essays in Postfoundationalist Theology. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans 1997.
van Huyssteen, J. Wentzel. 1998. Duet or Duel? Theology and Science in the Postmodern World. London: SCM Press.
van Huyssteen, J. Wentzel. 1999. The Shaping of Rationality: Toward Interdisciplinarity in Theology and Science. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.
van Huyssteen, J. Wentzel. 2006a. “When Our Bodies Do the Thinking, Theology and Science Converge,” American Journal of Theology & Philosophy 27:2-3 (September 2006): 127-153 (153).
van Huyssteen, J. Wentzel. 2006b. Alone in the World?: Human Uniqueness in Science and Theology. The Gifford Lectures. The University of Edinburgh. Spring 2004. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.
van Huyssteen, J. Wentzel. 2007. “Response to Critics”, American Journal of Theology & Philosophy (28:3): 409-432.
